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A B S T R A C T
Worldwide, the growth of marine tourism is creating opportunities for ﬁnancing marine protected areas
(MPAs), but what these ﬁnancial arrangements look like and how they can be governed at larger scales, and in
equitable and transparent ways, is unclear. This paper examines the governance arrangement of two region-
wide successive entrance fee systems established since 1997 in Raja Ampat, Indonesia, to ﬁnance a network of
MPAs delineated under the auspices of two big international non-governmental organizations (NGO), namely
Raja Ampat Entrance Fee and Raja Ampat Ecosystem Service Stewardship Fee. These two successive entrance
fee systems can be viewed as payment for environmental services (PES) arrangements. The PES-like entrance
fee arrangements improved in terms of participation, transparency and equity. In the second scheme, local
communities in Raja Ampat were involved in the design of the disbursement of the community fund, and the
criteria for disbursement became more clear and transparent. However, in both schemes there is no clear
connection between the distribution of the funds and activities that improve environmental services provision
(conditionality). In addition, the latter scheme is still facing equity challenges as some communities with
customary rights over marine tourism hotspots are asking for additional user-fees from tourists and tourism
operators.
1. Introduction
Over the last three decades, the designation of marine protected
areas (MPAs) worldwide has increased and proliferated, but not
reached a similar coverage compared to terrestrial protected areas
[11,38]. Generally, MPAs aim at the protection and maintenance of
ecological values and biodiversity conservation in response to increas-
ing marine activities and global environmental changes that lead to the
degradation of marine resources [12,31,34]. Generally, it is seen as the
responsibility of the government to designate and manage MPAs [11].
However, government funding for managing the increasing number of
MPAs is regarded insuﬃcient [42], and lack of monitoring and
enforcement makes it diﬃcult to achieve conservation objectives.
With 70–80% of MPAs worldwide being labelled as ‘paper park’ [12],
the dependency on only government funding to achieve marine
conservation is therefore considered problematic [42].
Marine tourism is widely regarded as a strategy to overcome the
shortfall of ﬁnance for eﬀective management of MPAs, for example
through user payments and licensing fees [12,38,42], philanthropic
donations [31], or private conservation mechanisms [11]. Various
studies have examined the opportunities and limits of tourist entrance
fees for ﬁnancing MPAs, for example with regard to the tourists’
willingness to pay (WTP) entrance fees to cover management costs
[8,16,29], the mixed attitudes of tourists toward entrance fees and their
structure [7], and the impact of entrance fees on visitation [42]. While
most of the mentioned literature focuses on the tourist side, the
literature on the governance side of MPA entrance fee arrangements
is rather scarce, particularly regarding their longer term ability to
deliver tangible results for the stakeholders and communities involved.
A recent and relevant perspective is provided by the literature on
payments for environmental services (PES). PES was invented as a
market approach to overcome environmental externality problems
[18,28,41]. Implementation of PES is aimed at providing incentives
to those who manage or have control over natural resources to make
decisions that maintain positive or reduce negative externalities
through direct market transactions. Those who bear the cost of
generating a particular environmental service should be compensated
by those who beneﬁt from the service. The most widely used con-
ceptualization of PES describes it as: (1) a voluntary transaction
between (2) at least one service provider who must secure its provision
and (3) at least one service buyer for (4) environmental service (ES) (5)
if and only if the service provider secures the provision of the
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environmental service (conditionality) [44]. Most PES programs world-
wide are implemented for terrestrial environments [20], with common
environmental services being carbon sequestration and storage, biodi-
versity conservation, watershed protection, and landscape beauty [44],
administered through diﬀerent market mechanisms, such as ecotour-
ism, watershed services, hunting permits and green commodities
[10,19]. There is great potential of PES arrangements for conserving
coastal and marine environmental resources, including in commercial
ﬁshing, aquaculture and marine tourism [14], but the current literature
is limited.
Lessons from the implementation of PES arrangements in terres-
trial environmental settings suggest a number of design principles for
successful PES governance arrangements. First, the design of the PES
arrangement needs to be clear on who the buyer is, what environmental
service is delivered (conditionality) and how the payment mechanism
works. Second, direct transactions between buyers and sellers are
favoured over payment mechanisms aided by intermediaries [28], as
direct payments enhance transparency. Third, payment mechanisms
need to represent an equitable distribution of costs and beneﬁts in the
eyes of the participating groups [1]. Fourth, it is important for local
communities, in whose territories the PES arrangement is set, to
beneﬁt, for example by income accrued to local communities, job
creation, or other forms of livelihood enhancement [17]. Conceptually,
these design principles of PES arrangements resonate with the
environmental governance literature in understanding how governance
arrangements can be steered in ways that are seen by those involved as
eﬀective, participatory, equitable and transparent [23]
This paper aims to contribute to our understanding of policy change
in ﬁnancing marine conservation tourism by analysing the Raja Ampat
entrance fee as a PES governance arrangement. Even though there is
no explicit statement about a particular paradigm on which the Raja
Ampat entrance fee was developed, it shows a relationship with the
concept of ecosystem services (ES) - ecosystem processes, functions,
organization or structure utilized or consumed by human being for
Fig. 1. Map of the case study area (adapted from [15]).
E. Atmodjo et al. Marine Policy 78 (2017) 181–188
182
their wellbeing [13,35], where the fund paid by tourists will be used to
maintain ES. Therefore, in this paper we will analyse the evolvement of
the Raja Ampat entrance fee as a PES arrangement.
The designation of the [30] opened opportunities for marine
resources to be managed locally [40]. The Indonesian central govern-
ment policy regarding marine conservation gave way for the establish-
ment of locally managed MPAs as part of sustainable marine resource
use [33]. This has led to the establishment and management of six
MPAs developed under the auspices of two international non-govern-
mental organizations (NGOs) involved in nature conservation, i.e.
Conservation International (CI) and The Nature Conservancy (TNC).
The management of these MPAs has recently been transferred to the
local authorities. In attempting to ensure economic beneﬁts from
tourism to local communities, in 2007 the Raja Ampat Regency
government established a tourist entrance fee system [26]. This scheme
encountered a range of governance challenges regarding the manage-
ment and disbursement of the funds generated, and was revised in
2015, after being in eﬀect for eight years.
This paper aims to understand the extent to which the revision of
the entrance fee system of Raja Ampat resulted in a better design from
a PES perspective, to identify the governance challenges of the
arrangement with regards to transparency and equity, and to generate
insights in the global challenge of ﬁnancing marine conservation.
The next two sections present Raja Ampat and the methodology
used in this study, including a description of the case study area, the
data collection and the analysis. Subsequently a brief historical account
is given of the establishment of the entrance fee scheme and the
challenges faced by the Raja Ampat, followed by an analysis of the two
schemes. The article closes with conclusions.
2. Raja Ampat marine conservation
The research is set in Raja Ampat, an archipelago in West Papua
Province, Indonesia (see Fig. 1), consisting of four large islands and
more than 600 small islands and atolls. The population of Raja Ampat
is relatively small, but it hosts diverse ethnic groups, including
indigenous Melanesian and long time settlers from adjacent areas
[2]. The area draws global attention because of its richness in marine
biodiversity [2,26,27]. Following the decentralization policy of the
Indonesian state [39,6], Raja Ampat was established as a regional
administrative unit in 2002, which became operational in 2005 [30].
The ﬁshery sector became a development priority during the ﬁrst 5
years of the new Regency, while marine tourism became more
important in the government development program since 2010 [4].
The potential beneﬁts of the rich marine biodiversity for marine
tourism suﬀered from illegal and destructive ﬁshing practices, both
by local community members as well as by outsiders [25,26]. Threats to
marine biodiversity in the area [26] encouraged marine conservation
eﬀorts involving various international NGOs [33], such as Conservation
International (CI) and The Nature Conservancy (TNC). A network of 6
MPAs was designated under auspices of CI and TNC, covering a total of
1.113 million hectares, scattered from the north part to the south part
of Raja Ampat [33] (see Fig. 1). In addition, from 2005 till 2015 the
World Bank coral reef rehabilitation and management program
(COREMAP II) funded and implemented various projects in the area.
In the wake of these international conservation initiatives marine
tourism activities have been growing over the last decade [26,37]. Raja
Ampat is considered a tourism hot-spot, well known for its incompar-
able coral reef diversity [21]. Tourism businesses increased consider-
ably in the last decade, with around 14,000 visitors in 2015, mostly
international tourists. Permanent yearly operation permits for livea-
boards (tourist vessels) is limited by the Regency to 40 vessels, permits
for resorts outside the capital city is limited to 20, while homestays
(local accommodations) have grown to more than 40 units. Raja
Ampat's tourist attractions range from coral reef SCUBA diving and
snorkelling, to bird watching, kayaking and scenery sightseeing. Most
of these tourist attractions are located in MPAs, with the majority in the
Selat Dampier MPA, while one of the most iconic attractions,
Piaynemo, is located outside any MPA (see Fig. 1).
To ensure the beneﬁt of marine conservation tourism to the local
communities, a tourism entrance fee system has been developed by the
local authority, which has undergone a number of remarkable changes
since its inception. The Raja Ampat tourist entrance fee scheme
thereby provides an excellent context for exploring governance ar-
rangements of ﬁnancing marine conservation tourism. The case study
of Raja Ampat allows us to carry out an in-depth exploration of these
governance challenges in a particular temporal and spatial setting
[22,45].
3. Methodology
3.1. Case study
To achieve the objective of this paper, i.e. understanding policy
change in ﬁnancing marine conservation tourism, a qualitative case
study research design was chosen [22]. Raja Ampat as case study area
provides diﬀerent characteristics compared to other PES schemes
outlined by most literatures. Most PES schemes are implemented on
single delineated terrestrial areas, with less heterogeneous local com-
munities, and few stakeholder organizations involved [3,9,17,23]. Raja
Ampat PES-like scheme is implemented in the whole Regency covering
around 4 million hectares area of archipelago where 117 villages and 6
MPAs are scattered across the Regency. Although it is has only around
56,000 inhabitants, the local communities of Raja Ampat consist of
four tribes. Each of the four tribes consists of several sub tribes [4].
This raises diﬀerent challenges in the implementation of the PES-like
scheme compared to similar schemes in other settings.
3.2. Data collection and analysis
Fieldwork was carried out between October 2014 and January
2015. Three qualitative data collection techniques were used in this
research, i.e. in-depth interviewing, participatory observation and
document analysis [22,32]. In-depth interviewing was used to obtain
information regarding the ideas, roles, resources and experiences of
actors involved in, as well as the rules and process that lead to, the
entrance fee arrangements [22,32]. Twenty two in-depth interviews
were held with individuals and small groups, involving 19 respondents
in total, identiﬁed by using the snowballing technique [5]. Key players
were approached ﬁrst, in this case the head of the Tourism Oﬃce of
Raja Ampat and the NGO representative who was involved deeply in
conservation in Raja Ampat. They were asked to suggest other relevant
individuals, which were then selected as respondents. Additional
respondents were found in this way, until no new information was
found from the last respondents. Respondents typically included those
in leading positions in marine conservation tourism governance, both
in the present and during the past two decades, such as government
directors and staﬀ (A), NGO oﬃcers and staﬀ (B), community leaders
(C) and tourism operators (D). Most interviews were recorded and
subsequently transcribed verbatim. Second, during ﬁeldwork we parti-
cipated in a number of activities and meetings as participant observer,
and functioned as a consulting expert in the redesign of the mechanism
to disburse collected entrance fees. Observations of discussions and
interactions between various actors during such meetings resulted in
detailed notes and insight. Thirteen participants of diﬀerent meetings
were identiﬁed providing information and opinions relevant to this
paper, hence they are also regarded as respondents (Table 1). Third,
document analysis was conducted to obtain information from a range
of secondary sources collected before and during the ﬁeldwork, such as
reports (published and unpublished), maps, minutes of meetings,
meeting presentations and websites.
The interview data formed the starting point for the analysis.
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Interviews were coded with an eye on the governance challenges faced
and the PES lessons presented in the introduction. The interview
ﬁndings were further substantiated, cross-checked and triangulated
using observation notes and documentation.
4. The Raja Ampat entrance fee
4.1. Establishment
The increasing involvement of foreign and non-indigenous people
and organizations in the development of tourism and marine con-
servation fuelled the local perspective on outsiders beneﬁtting more
from marine resources than the local community of Raja Ampat [25].
This has encouraged local communities holding customary rights over
marine resources in popular tourism sites to collect visitor fees from
tourists and tourism business to access these sites. While these
informal local entrance fees made sense from a community perspective,
this practice was seen as unfavourable by the conservation NGOs and
tourism businesses (B2 – B4, D5 –D11).
In 2007, the Regency government of Raja Ampat passed a regula-
tion that created the Raja Ampat entrance fee, partially to deal with the
problem of communities collecting entrance fees to their sites, and also
to generate revenue to cover the costs of marine conservation. Subject
to the regulation were visiting tourists and researchers, both interna-
tional and Indonesian, except Raja Ampat residents. An international
visitor would pay Rp 500,000 (equivalent to US$ 40), while an
Indonesian visitor paid Rp 250,000, for a one year permit to visit
tourist sites or conduct research in Raja Ampat Regency. Visitors would
be given a proof of payment and a souvenir. Rp 150,000 from each of
international tourists and Rp 75,000 from each of domestic tourists
(30% of entrance fee respectively) went to the general revenue of the
Regency. The rest of the revenue was divided into three allocations:
20% to cover the operational cost of managing the revenue of the
entrance fee system, 40% for the conservation fund, and the remaining
40% for the community fund.
The so-called non-retribution fund management team (fund man-
agement team hereafter) was established to manage the revenue of the
entrance fee and was accountable directly to the Regent. The fund
management team, led by the director of the tourism oﬃce, consisted
of a conservation section and a creative economic section. The
conservation section was led by a staﬀ member of the COREMAP
project, and further included managers of CI and TNC. It was
appointed to develop proposals to the fund management team and
organizing the disbursement of the fund for conservation eﬀorts. The
creative economic section, led by an oﬃcer of the tourism oﬃce and
including a homestay operator and a liveaboard operator, was ap-
pointed with the task of advising the fund management team and
organizing the disbursement of the fund for activities aimed at
improving local livelihood. Revenue from the entrance fee was allo-
cated to the general revenue of the Regency, to conservation eﬀorts
(e.g. rule enforcement in MPAs, ecological monitoring of coral reefs), to
a community fund to enhance local livelihood, and to the costs of the
fund management team.
The fund management team was not guided by speciﬁc rules or any
standard operating procedure (SOP) that would describe the working
procedures of the fund management team and the disbursement
mechanism of the revenue to the community or to conservation eﬀorts
(A2). Interviews, however, revealed that the revenue of the entrance fee
was initially used to provide food supplements for children under 5
years old in 75 villages, and was later on used for funding projects
proposed by local communities or NGOs (A1, A2). Project proposals
submitted by local communities were collected by the secretary, and
subsequently analysed by the fund management team for approval.
4.2. Challenges
When analysing the Raja Ampat entrance fee in line with the PES
principle, it becomes clear that the entrance fee was applied to
international and domestic tourists and researchers, who can be
identiﬁed as ecosystem service (ES) buyers (Raja Ampat Regency
Regulation 64, 2007; 65, 2007). However, the supply side of the
Table 1
List of respondents.
Respondent Affiliation
A1 Tourism office
A2 Tourism office
A3 Tourism office
B1 NGO
B2 NGO
B3 NGO
B4 NGO
B5 NGO
B6 NGO
C1 Local community leader
C2 Local community leader
C3 Local community leader
C4-C7 Local community leader (FGD)
C8-C10 Local community leader (FGD)
C11-C13 Local community leader (FGD)
C14 Member of provincial house of representative/Leader of local
NGO
D1-D3 Board member of homestay association (FGD)
D4 Homestay operator
D5 Resort operator
D6 Resort operator
D7 Resort operator
D8 Liveboard operator
D9 Liveboard operator
D10 Liveboard operator
D11 Liveboard operator
D12 Liveboard operator
D13 Speed boat operator
D14 Speed boat operator
D15 Speed boat operator
Fig. 2. Overview of Raja Ampat Entrance Fee through PES framework. =Clear arrangement; =Unclear arrangement.
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ecosystem service was not clear-cut (Fig. 2). The supply side of the
ecosystem service was identiﬁed by analysing the role of actors in the
ﬁeld, both in interviews and in policy documentation (Regulation 65/
2007). The Regency and local communities can be seen as principle ES
sellers, as the payment granted access to environmental resources in
their region and part of the revenue is accrued by community members
whose community project proposals were approved. Further, the
analysis of revenue disbursement revealed that some proposals were
submitted by MPA staﬀ who worked for TNC and CI for conservation
eﬀorts conducted in MPAs managed by CI and TNC. This positioned CI
and TNC as ES sellers as well, because their conservation activities
were partly ﬁnanced by revenues from the entrance fee. At the same
time, the members of the fund management team, including the NGOs
and a local tourism operator, can be regarded as intermediaries in the
ecosystem service purchasing process, as they disbursed the entrance
fee to the recipients. It has been argued that this mixing of roles on the
supply side has aﬀected the transparency of the revenue distribution
process.
As the entrance fee system and the fund management team were
established through government regulation, the revenue collected was
considered government funds, to be managed according to central
government ﬁnancial regulations and subjected to governmental
ﬁnancial audits. An interview with the secretary of the fund manage-
ment team revealed that the lack of operating procedures and
mechanisms for disbursement had made the team very cautious in
money disbursement, in order to avoid violations of government
regulation. This resulted in the accumulation of the funds in the
account of the fund management team and a very low disbursement
rate. Respondents from NGOs mentioned that with respect to the
objective set during its establishment the entrance fee system was
considered ineﬀective (B3). This has led to disappointment among the
local community who had refrained from illegal and destructive ﬁshing.
Furthermore, it turned out that the entrance fee system had not
stopped some villages close to popular sites from collecting their own
visitation fee from tourists and tourism operators. Two tourism livea-
board operator (D1, D1) pointed out that: “..it is as if the situation has
been back to the beginning..”. Two village oﬃcers (C2, C3) acknowl-
edged that they have issued a Village Regulation to collect tourist fee,
while a secretary of another village (C1) implicitly acknowledged that
they were also collecting fees from tourists by saying: ”…we will stop
asking fees if the community fund is distributed to our village.”
Analysis of the disbursement mechanism of the revenues revealed
that there was no speciﬁc ES provision required by the recipient
through the fund management team. The idea was mentioned that
payments to local communities were made in an attempt to encourage
them to preserve the marine and coastal environment (A1, A2, B1-B4).
Growth of local tourism businesses funded by revenue from the
entrance fee was assumed to increase boat traﬃc that can help in
stewardship of the surrounding environment (B3). However, no
arrangement related the payment to actors that improve the environ-
mental quality and to the kind of conduct necessary. In consequence,
the conditionality of the PES could not be monitored or assured.
In an interview about the design and implementation plan of the
new entrance fee system, a resort operator (A1) voiced the disappoint-
ment of the local community:
“There was disappointment in Misool on the disbursement of the
community fund in the past by evenly distributing the fund to all
villages. Tourist destination villages which were visited more by
tourists disagree with the scheme and think it is illogical”
According to community fund distribution data, the ﬁrst distribu-
tion of revenue from the entrance fee was made in 2010, in the form of
healthy food supplements for children under 5 years old. The food
supplements were distributed evenly to 75 villages. The implementa-
tion was made in collaboration with the health units of the respective
villages. Since 2011, the fund was used to ﬁnance proposals submitted
by local communities to develop tourism business and to conduct
conservation activities in some villages. The distribution of healthy
food supplements was discontinued. It is clear that the idea of resort
operator A1 mentioned above does not completely match the revenue
distribution process, since the community and conservation fund were
distributed based on proposals submitted to the fund management
team instead of being evenly distributed among all villages. However,
the distribution did reﬂect challenges in transparency, equity as well as
conditionality.
4.3. Revisions
In 2014, changes in regulation from the Regency brought a range of
modiﬁcations to the arrangement of the entrance fee system (Regent
Regulation 18/2014). First, the responsibility for managing the tourist
entrance fee was transferred from fund management team to UPTD-
KKPD, a local authority under the Marine and Fishery Oﬃce, whose
primary responsibility is the management of the MPA network. This
meant that the Regency retained a prominent role in the management
of the scheme. Second, the entrance fee system was oﬃcially renamed
ecosystem service stewardship fee, called stewardship fee hereafter.
Third, parallel with the transfer of responsibility changes in the annual
entrance fee rates took place, increasing it to Rp 1,000,000 for
international and Rp 500,000 for Indonesian visitors. Fourth, under
the new scheme the largest share of the fund is allocated to cover
operational and non-operational costs of managing the MPA network,
while Rp 1.5 billion per year will be allocated for the community fund.
The contribution of international tourists to the general revenue of the
Regency was doubled to Rp 300,000 per visitor, while domestic
tourists’ contribution remained at Rp 75,000 per visitor. Hence, 70%
of the revenue from international tourists and 85% of the revenue from
domestic tourists will be managed by UPT-KKPD to cover operational
and non-operational costs, after deduction of Rp 1.5 billion for the
community fund.
As more than 70% of the revenues from the stewardship fee will be
used by UPTD-KKPD in managing the MPA network, UPTD-KKPD is
identiﬁed as the central ES seller in the new arrangement. Since
regulation on the establishment of UPTD-KKPD also incorporate NGOs
as partners of the MPA network management, they also play a role as
the ES sellers. The provision of Rp 1.5 billion per year for the
community fund puts the community in a ES seller position as well.
The strategic business plan of UPTD-KKPD outlined four strategic
programs, namely institutional enhancement, MPA network manage-
ment, livelihood improvement of local communities around MPAs, and
monitoring and evaluation. An important activity in the implementa-
tion plan of the strategic programs is stewardship patrol, which
according to the business and budget plan absorbs 67% of on site
management costs of MPAs. Minimum outputs of stewardship patrol,
as well as activities of other strategic programs are clearly stated in the
plan. Rangers of the MPA authority are required to conduct marine
patrols in the MPAs twice a week, involving the community surveil-
lance group consisting of four villagers. Standard operating procedures
for implementation of planned activities were also developed. A
supervisory and audit body was established in the organizational
structure of UPTD-KKPD, to monitor revenue utilization from the
stewardship fee. This arrangement shows a potentially strong con-
ditionality of ES payment.
Standard operating procedures for disbursement of the community
fund were also established. The process leading to the establishment of
the standard operating procedures consisted of two main steps,
conducted under auspices of CI, TNC and Starling Resources (SR), a
management consultancy ﬁrm focused on conservation under Bird
Head Seascape (BHS) partnership. The ﬁrst step was a review of the
previous entrance fee system and community consultancy. Community
consultancy consisted of in-depth interviews with relevant government
oﬃcers, tourism operators, as well as local leaders to obtain possible
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designs for allocation and disbursement. Three focus group discussions
(FGD) were then conducted involving village community leaders of
villages around MPAs to generate opinions and advice regarding the
design of allocation and disbursement of the community fund. The
selected design of allocation and disbursement of the community fund
were then brought to the second step, a formal procedure for establish-
ment of government regulation called public consultancy, involving
relevant heads of governmental institutions, members of the house of
representatives of the Regency, and local community leaders. The
approved allocation and disbursement mechanism was then commu-
nicated to the villages in a series of FGDs.
The steps taken to create the fairly complex design of the mechan-
ism of community disbursement are expected to improve transparency.
The community fund can only be disbursed based on proposals
submitted by village governments or village community groups, and
which are approved by the village head, village representatives and
community leaders. However, the design of community fund allocation
is also quite complex, since many factors have to be considered in the
allocation. Village location within MPAs, tourist visitation, and cus-
tomary rights over marine resources are important factors, according
to community respondents (C4 – C13). It is common in Raja Ampat that
tribes or sub-tribes with acknowledged customary rights may live in
diﬀerent villages away from the sites. Another issue frequently pointed
out is that even though tourists are visiting particular areas, Raja
Ampat itself is seen as trade mark meaning that all villages of Raja
Ampat deserve community fund allocation. Local tourism operators,
such as the homestay association, also requested involvement in the
community fund allocation and disbursement. Based on the factors
mentioned previously, the community fund is divided into two parts,
i.e. Rp 75 million (5%) is allocated for small grants for Regency wide
local NGOs, while the remaining part (Rp 1.425 billion) is allocated for
the village-based community fund. According to Regency Regulation
18/2014, the community fund is eligible only for conservation activ-
ities, economic improvement and social aﬀairs of village governments
or community groups.
The allocation design of the village community fund is progressive,
in the sense that villages with more attributes in relation to MPAs and
more tourist visitation will receive more funding. To accommodate the
customary rights issue, villages recognized as having customary rights
of marine resources in MPAs and tourist destination villages are
eligible for these categories. In order to encourage villages adjacent
to MPAs to support conservation eﬀorts, they are designated as buﬀer
villages in the allocation design. The resulting village-based community
fund allocation design is depicted in Table 2.
Among villages that have one or more attributes in relation to MPAs
and tourist visitation, the tourist visited village category is allocated the
smallest share of the community fund, while villages within MPAs that
are also visited by tourists are allocated the highest share. However,
there is no village recognized as being visited by tourists and located
outside or not adjacent to an MPA. Therefore, the allocation of
community funds to villages that have one or more attributes ranged
from Rp 13,280,000 (a buﬀer village) to Rp 18,750,000 (village within
MPA visited by tourists). While the allocated fund for villages that do
not have any attribute in relation to MPA or tourists visitation is very
small (‘other villages’), the funds for other categories of villages are
fairly similar.
Despite the clear allocation and disbursement mechanism of the
community fund, the conditionality is less clear. The community fund
disbursement is subject to the condition that proposals must be
contributing to conservation or community livelihood. However, the
extent to which activities funded by the community fund are actually
contributing to ES supply is still unclear, as there is no contractual
arrangement that requires ES provision upon ES payment. The idea
that the community fund disbursement is expected to encourage
community involvement in conservation eﬀorts is adopted in the new
scheme (see Fig. 3 for a graphical overview of the stewardship fee).
4.4. Remaining challenges
Despite the increased clarity of the Raja Ampat stewardship fee in
terms of the PES principle, also this arrangement still faces some
challenges. First, although allocation of the community fund seemed to
be equitable, the funds are very small for a village. Resort operators
(D6-D7) mentioned in a meeting that the community of Selpele,
recognized by other communities as having customary rights of
Wayag island, even though Selpele is about one hour by speed boat,
is still asking for Rp 1 million fee per boat presumably because it is the
icon of Raja Ampat marine tourism. The revenue from this extra fee is
expected to be much more than the community fund allocated to them.
Saporkren village implemented village regulation asking for a retribu-
tion of Rp 50,000 per tourist and Rp 100,000 per boat (C3). During a
dissemination FGD (C4-C13), some community leaders asked for
possibilities to pass regulation for collecting tourism retribution from
tourists and boats visiting the village and tourism spots around the
village. They saw this as an opportunity to beneﬁt from tourism, as they
have refrained from engaging in destructive ﬁshing methods which
have made the growth of marine conservation tourism possible.
Second, the concept of ‘tourist visited village’ is also quite unclear,
as it is only based on expectation. Sales reports cannot be used for the
designation of a tourist visited village because most tourists visit more
than one village and dive/snorkelling spots. Liveaboards trips usually
take seven to ten days, consisting of around 30 dives in diﬀerent spots
around Raja Ampat. Disputes about the tourist visited village status
may diminish the eﬀectiveness of the arrangement.
Third, the community fund disbursement mechanism is designed in
such a way that the in-kind payment, i.e. contributions in the form of
goods and programs instead of cash, is delivered to villages so that the
community receives the full amount of the fund allocated. Distributing
the community fund to 117 villages in the vast marine area of Raja
Ampat is costly. In some cases, the transaction costs involved in
delivering the community fund distribution can be higher than the fund
allocated to a particular village.
Fourth, concerns regarding the equity of the arrangement in
relation to customary rights were also revealed during the dissemina-
Table 2
Village-based community fund allocation per year (2015).
Base allocation (Rp) Tourism village allocation
(Rp)
Conservation village allocation
(Rp)
Buffer village allocation
(Rp)
Total allocation (Rounded)
(Rp)
Village within MPA 2,564,103 – 12,019,231 – 14,590,000
Tourist visited village 2,564,103 4,116,667 – – 6,680,770
Buﬀer village 2,564,103 – – 10,714,286 13,280,000
Village within MPA+ tourist
visited village
2,564,103 4,116,667 12,019,231 – 18,750,000
Buﬀer village+ Tourists visited
village
2,564,103 4,116,667 – 10,714,286 17,450,000
Other village 2,564,103 – – – 2,565,000
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tion meetings. For example, customary ownership of uninhabited
tourism spots in an MPA are sometimes held by owners residing in a
village outside the MPA. Also, villages often simply do not know
whether or not their village is located within an MPA. In order to
accommodate customary rights in the scheme, villages in which the
customary owners of MPA resources reside is considered a village
within an MPA for community fund disbursement purpose. Challenges
still exists, however, as conﬂicts on customary ownership over natural
resources is increasing since the emergence of marine tourism [37].
5. Conclusion
This paper explored the opportunities of using tourism for ﬁnan-
cing marine conservation from a PES perspective. More speciﬁcally we
analysed the governance challenges and implementation dynamics of
the region-wide entrance fee system in Raja Ampat, Indonesia. The
Raja Ampat entrance fee system can be seen as a state-run PES scheme
because the government is the main actor in both arrangements. It is
the ﬁrst of its type and the only scheme currently in eﬀect in Indonesia.
In general, this paper concludes that the weaknesses of the previous
entrance fee system, when analysed with the design principles of
eﬀective PES arrangements, were only partially addressed.
First, our analysis reveals how recent changes in the institutional
arrangement of the Raja Ampat entrance fee system have improved
participation and transparency. Community groups have been con-
sulted in the process of revising the entrance fee system, and awareness
of village communities increased about the opportunities and amounts
of disbursement. Moreover, the organization of the entrance fee system
has been clariﬁed in terms of organization and procedure, leading to a
more direct disbursement. Some interviewees mentioned that they
were not aware of the revenue ﬂow from tourism fees, and had no idea
on whether or not the tourism fee accrued to their village, even if they
actually received community fund from the old entrance fee system.
The improved participation and transparency improved the legitimacy
of the fee system among various stakeholders. Hence, our study
emphasizes and conﬁrms the importance of participation and trans-
parency in multi-actor conservation tourism arrangements, particularly
when remote local communities are involved (see also [23]).
Second, the revised entrance fee system resulted in a more clear and
equitable arrangement for disbursing community funds to villages in
Raja Ampat, based on factors such as the location of the village in or
adjacent to an MPA and tourist visitation. However, equity issues
remain on the agenda as it is unclear for villages what constitutes a
tourist village and tourist visitation is not distributed evenly across the
Regency, even among MPAs. Many tourists visit the easy accessible
tourism attractions in Selat Dampier MPA, while Ayau-Asia MPA
receives almost no tourist visit and Teluk Mayalibit MPA is visited
only by very small number of tourists. On the other hand, Piaynemo
island, located outside any MPA, is visited by many tourists and has
become the new icon of Raja Ampat. The resulting uneven distribution
of funds will likely continue to stir equity debates among villages.
Third, this paper argues that conditionality is not only important in
relation to environmental service buyers, but also with respect to
environmental service sellers. We argue with Wunder [43,44] that
conditionality, when environmental service sellers are paid only if
provision of environmental services by environmental service sellers is
secured, is considered an important but diﬃcult criterion to meet in
PES schemes. We have seen how a number of governance challenges
that remain unsettled are particularly related to the conditionality of
sellers. For example, one condition for customary right owners to
receive community funds would be to stop collecting fees from tourists
and tour operators, but not all seem to abide by this rule. The case of
Selpele shows that the mandate - given to the government by
customary resource owners - to manage the marine resource does
not automatically transfer all rights along with it. The Dutch colonial
period and the precolonial era under the Tidore Sultanate have created
a complex and dynamic structure of customary ownership rights over
natural resources. Raja Ampat community consists of diﬀerent ethni-
cities [4], each with a diﬀerent status of rights and ownership in
relation to natural resources. From an institutional perspective,
property and user rights are important elements in the market of
environmental services, as those who hold property or user rights can
control the use of natural resources that are incorporated in a PES
scheme [36,41].
Further, and related, this study has demonstrated that scale matters
in PES arrangements, in multiple ways. Contrary to most PES
arrangements that work in a relatively small delineated area, the
Raja Ampat entrance fee system is a region-wide arrangement im-
plemented to ﬁnance a network of six MPAs scattered across the
Regency. While this delineation makes sense from a regional institu-
tional perspective, the previous paragraph shows that due to diﬀer-
ences in visitation, location and customary rights of local communities
it makes more sense to settled payments on a local scale. Hence,
various factors should be included in carefully considering scale in PES
arrangements.
Finally, as in many PES initiatives [44], payments in Raja Ampat
are up front (as prescribed in Regulation 64/2007 and its successor
Regulation 18/2014). Monitoring is then necessary to ensure that the
recipient of the entrance fee would undertake actions to secure the
provision of the environmental service. In order to be able to monitor
the extent to which environmental service provision matches the
payments, well-deﬁned environmental service and contractual arrange-
Fig. 3. Overview of Raja Ampat Stewardship Fee using a PES framework. =Clear arrangement; =Less clear arrangement.
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ments have to be available. However, the Raja Ampat entrance fee
system lacks a directive (working manual or SOP) by which environ-
mental services provided by sellers can be measured. But it is not
unique in this. A review of 72 market schemes for biodiversity
conservation revealed that an agreed upon measurement of biodiver-
sity was absent and that the environmental service resulting from
biodiversity conservation is mostly intangible [24]. If the wider
deﬁnition of conditionality is applied, which is that any payment
should encourage the provision of environmental services, the entrance
fee system cannot be considered a PES arrangement, as there was and
is no rule under this scheme that requires environmental service sellers
to perform conservation or community livelihood improvement actions
in order to be eligible to receive payment. A way forward would be to
revise the directive for the distribution of community funds in such a
way that communities are required to sign a contractual agreement
with conservation oriented condition and actions, for example to
replant mangroves, or to provide mooring buoys for liveaboard or
speedboat, on submitting proposals for community funds. Mooring
buoys will not only protect the surrounding coral reefs, as liveaboards
and speedboats do not have to release anchors or keep drifting, but can
also generate income for the village by applying a mooring fee.
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